USFIA - United States Fashion Industry Association

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: In a hypothetical Trump/Vance economy, a toaster would cost about $300

Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at the Progressive Policy Institute, put out his trade fact of the week, looking at how the proposed measures to save U.S. manufacturing jobs by the Trump campaign would negatively impact the cost of every day household items. Gresser uses the toaster as an example, after Vance said “We believe that a million cheap knockoff toasters aren’t worth the price of a single U.S. manufacturing job” at a Nevada event in July and looks at what rising appliance costs would mean for family budgets.

Gresser also shares how inconceivable it is that the proposed tariff increases of 10% and 60% would bring toaster making home to America:

The U.S. already charges a 5.3% tariff on pop-up toasters (HTS 85167200). None are made here. So as with a lot of U.S. tariff lines, the toaster tariff’s only effect is somewhat higher prices. To get the spectacular ten-fold price-hike that sustains super-toaster making in Japan, Italy, and the U.K., you’d need a 900% tariff or some equivalent policy. (Or, if you need only a five-fold price jump to make less impressive appliances profitable, 400%.) In fact, the additional Trump/Vance tariffs on metals, wiring, buttons, plastics, and other inputs would make U.S.-based toaster-making — including for currently successful producers like Holman Star — harder, not easier. The differentially higher tariff on Chinese-made popups might push some into Vietnam or the Philippines, or possibly Mexico, but that would be the end of it.

In sum, Vance-world looks very expensive for families, not obviously better for workers, and not realistic anyway.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Polling: U.S. public is against Trump tariffs by about 60%-36%

Ed Gresser, PPI’s Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, published his trade fact of the week confirming that recent polls show consumers do not like the Trump Administration’s tariffs.

The polls — CNN/SSRS, Fox News, Washington Post/ABC News, New York Times/Siena, Pew Center, NBC News, NPR/Marist, Economist/YouGov — suggest three areas of broad consensus: high awareness of the tariff increases; an overall negative view of them; and alarm about the cost of living. The “crosstabs” and “internals,” meanwhile, suggest convergence among some groups whose views on trade policy have differed in previous 21st-century polls — college and non-college, urban and rural, high- and low-income — and apparently widening opinion gaps by race and ethnicity, and by political affiliation.

Gresser notes that while polling normally finds college-educated Americans to be more “pro-trade” than non-college educated, that gap has disappeared in these recent polls. It has been replaced by widening gaps in views of trade among race and ethnicity – white Americans tend to be the least critical of the Trump Administration on trade. The partisan divide on trade is much wider in these polls than we’ve seen in previous 21st century polls.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Tariffs are a poor form of taxation

Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at the Progressive Policy Institute, published his trade fact of the week, examining various countries’ reliance on tariffs as a share of government revenue. Tariffs currently make up 1.8% of the U.S. government’s revenue. The Trump/Vance proposal would bring that up to approximately 25.6%.

No “developed” country now uses tariffs for more than 2.7% of revenue; World Bank tables find Gambia, whose government gets 41.6% of its money from tariffs, the most tariff-reliant country in the world. At 25.6%, the U.S. would be below Gambia, but in the neighborhood of tariff-heavy jurisdictions such as Somalia, the Bahamas, pre-war West Bank and Gaza, Nepal, and Ethiopia — that is, countries too small, politically disordered, and/or poor to operate professional bureaucracies able to assess and collect revenue from broader sources such as income, wealth, or consumption.

Gresser references PPI’s newest paper, It’s Not 1789 Anymore: Why Trump’s Tariff Agenda Would Hurt America by Fiscal Policy Analyst Laura Duffy, which examines why James Madison and Alexander Hamilton did not choose tariffs as the “main early-republic and 19th-century revenue source” and the problems the Trump/Vance proposal would run into. Duffy closes the paper with this observation:

Replacing tariffs with direct taxes on incomes was also a huge step in making American public finance more rational and equitable. … Returning to tariff-heavy policies, as suggested by Trump, would be fiscally irresponsible and counterproductive. Beyond their revenue-generating limitations, tariffs are extremely susceptible to lobbying from protected industries at the expense of other businesses, workers, and consumers. Finally, the distortionary effects of returning to pre-modern tariff rates would be extremely damaging to the American economy and undermine the strong wage and job gains the country has seen in the past three years.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: The 1890s were not America’s “wealthiest” age

Ed Gresser, PPI’s Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, published his trade fact of the week pushing back on a Trump Administration talking point around reciprocal tariffs.

The administration and Mr. Trump personally justify high tariffs not by alluding to the success of modern high-tariff countries, but by looking a long way back through the American past. To cite an eccentric and frequently repeated comment:

“In the 1890s our country was probably the wealthiest it ever was because it was a system of tariffs.”

What to make of this?

It’s true that America had high tariff rates in the 1890s. The U.S. International Trade Commission’s table of tariff rates back to 1891 shows a “trade-weighted average” tariff averaging 27.9% from 1891 to 1900, over ten times the 2.4% of 2023. It’s wrong, though, to say American wealth peaked relative to other countries, let alone in absolute terms, at that time. Based on the research of Angus Maddison et al., the U.S.’ share of ‘global GDP’ in the 1890s was probably around 15%. This is a lot higher than it had been before the Civil War (which was also a high-tariff period), but well below the levels of the 1950s and 1960s (after 30 years of steadily falling tariffs), and about the same as it is today. …

Gilded Age tariff system defenders argued that high tariffs protected Americans from “low-wage” European and Asian competition. Critics said it mainly protected monopolies, while encouraging political corruption and depressing middle-class living standards. Public opinion polls weren’t invented until the 1930s, so we don’t really know how the public in general felt. But opposition to high-tariff policy in the 1890s and 1900s was strong, organized, and persistent enough to convince 42 state legislatures to pass an amendment to the Constitution in 1913 authorizing the creation of the income tax, which replaced the tariff as the main federal revenue source.

So, not an era of wealth and not a tax policy the public loved. Nor a time anyone should want to revisit.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Trump tariffs more likely to shrink than enlarge U.S. manufacturing industry

Ed Gresser, PPI’s Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, published his trade fact of the week to show how the IEEPA tariffs may be intended to support U.S. manufacturing, but actually the tariffs are more likely to hurt manufacturers.

Imports of business inputs – “intermediate goods” like chemicals and metals, raw materials like energy and metal ores, and capital goods such as power equipment — are substantially larger than imports of consumer goods. So the Trump tariffs are likely to raise U.S. production costs even more than they raise mall and grocery prices. …

With this in mind, some specially protected “manufacturing sectors” might gain. But U.S. manufacturing in general will have higher costs and probably get relatively smaller. The earlier round of Trump tariffs provides some guidance here: per a 2023 U.S. International Trade Commission study, the 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs over three years raised the two metals’ output by $2.2 billion, but simultaneously shrank the U.S. auto parts, machinery, toolmaking and other metal-using industries by $3.5 billion. On a larger scale, since the metals and “301” tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018/2019, manufacturing has fallen from 10.9% to 9.9% of U.S. GDP. Real manufacturing output growth and employment totals, meanwhile, have slowed from the annual $40 billion and 100,000 net jobs averages of the post-financial crisis Obama years to $30 billion and 30,000.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. clothing tariffs are unfair to women

PPI’s Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, once again highlights how import tariffs unfairly target women’s clothing in his latest trade fact of the week. Building on his Valetines Day trade fact covering higher tariffs for women’s underwear, Gresser’s latest piece looks at women’s and men’s clothing overall, finding that “combining all the categories, tariff rates on women’s clothing are on average 16.7%, 2.9 percentage points higher than the 13.6% average for men’s.”

Gresser also notes that FTAs don’t help much and may even amplify the issue with restrictive and complex rules of origin. The New Democrat Coalition in the House published an eight-point trade policy plan which includes the goal to “advance equity in trade policy by considering solutions to reduce gender bias and regressivity in the tariff system.”

Gresser writes that the findings point to systemic problems with U.S. tariffs for clothing:

What does this all mean in practice? Last year’s tariff payments totaled $4.7 billion on $31.1 billion worth of women’s clothes, and $3.1 billion for $24.2 billion worth of men’s clothes. Or, in more direct terms, markups and U.S. transport and overhead costs mean that the cost of an average shirt or coat roughly quadruples from arrival at the border to the cashier, the tariff system appears to be raising the price women pay for clothes, relative to men, by an average of an extra dollar per garment. Looking at this another way, a 2018 working paper from the U.S International Trade Commission concluded that the higher rates on women’s clothes — their finding, pre-“301” tariff, was 14.9% for women’s clothes and 12.0% for men’s — plus the fact that women on average tend to purchase more clothing than men, meant that buyers of women clothes shouldered an additional $2.77 billion in tariff burden than buyers of men’s clothes. Gender bias in the tariff system accounted for about $1.8 billion extra burden on buyers of women’s clothing as of 2015, and presumably somewhat more now.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at the Progressive Policy Institute, published his trade fact of the week, looking at who should be able to impose a tax under the U.S. Constitution.

The Constitution gives a pretty clear answer. Its four sentences on trade policy all come from “Article II” (on Congress), with two from Section 8’s “enumerated powers” list, and two from Section 9’ “denied powers” list. The first (see below for the others) says flatly that “The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

Giving Congress this power wasn’t a big Constitutional-drafting controversy. The “taxes, duties, imposts, and excises” clause, in fact, appears to have survived untouched from the first draft presented to the Constitutional Convention on August 6, 1787, to its publication on September 19th. James Madison’s notes of the August 16 session (the day the Convention debated import and export taxes) report none of that day’s 15 speakers arguing that a president should be able to set tariff (or other tax) rates. Why not? A single individual given power to set tax rates could use them to reward self and friends, punish critics, impoverish political or business rivals, etc.. A big Congress with lots of mutually suspicious factions might not find this impossible, but would have much more trouble agreeing to do it.

Gresser points to a few laws that “may have inadvertently provided presidents with something closer to genuinely arbitrary power,” such as the Section 232 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. While none of those laws envisions a President deliberately bypassing Congressional authority to levy taxes, Gresser provides two arguments on whether current trade laws override the “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises” clause and past Supreme Court actions that deal with this issue.

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. tariffs are taxes paid by Americans

Ed Gresser, PPI’s Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, is focused on who pays U.S. tariffs in his trade fact of the week. He begins with a brief explanation of tariffs since there have been some “puzzling assertions that foreigners might somehow pay tariffs.” Gresser, who was testifying in front of the Joint Economic Committee later that day, used his fellow witnesses’ testimony to help illustrate the three economic results of raising the U.S. tariff rate.

Those three results?

Prices rise for families.

A series of studies earlier this year — including from Erica York of the Tax Foundation and Brendan Duke of the Center for American Progress, both also appearing at this afternoon’s hearing — suggest that a 10% tariff plus a higher rate on Chinese-made goods would cost families $2,200 to $6,000 a year. That’s a jump of at least 10% from the $25,150 the Bureau of Labor Statistics found average families spending on goods last year. The costs of this type of tax increase fall most heavily on low-income families and least heavily on wealthy families — naturally, since lower-income households spend more of their income than average buying goods, and top-end households less.

Retail, manufacturing, agriculture, construction, and restaurants – the goods-using parts of the U.S. economy – will decline when compared with the rest of the U.S. economy.

This is because, all else equal, if you tax one part of the economy but not another, the taxed part gets smaller.... As tariffs on energy, metals, paint, fertilizer, and other inputs raise factory and farm production costs, U.S. manufacturers and agriculture will lose ground to foreign rivals. Construction firms and retailers, meanwhile, lose sales as home prices rise and sticker shocks hit groceries, drug stores, and clothing aisles. … these goods-using parts of the economy gets smaller relative to businesses who spend less on goods — say, real estate and financial services firms — who put much more of their money into investment and services.

Exporters suffer multiple harms.

Most obviously, countries hit with tariffs — especially in violation of trade agreements – often retaliate. Exporters are then the “cannon fodder” of trade wars — the first pushed into the front line, and the first to fall. … Less obviously, many export losses come without retaliation at all. As we noted earlier this month, the $141 billion in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona exports flowing south to Mexico last year included tens of billions of dollars in auto parts, semiconductors, and other specialized products sold to Mexican assembly plants. Tariffing or blocking the cars and appliances they produce means they will shrink; then, in turn, they place fewer orders with their Phoenix, Rio Rancho, El Paso, and Houston suppliers, and they shrink too.

PPI: Brace yourself: Trump’s trade war is about to make Americans poorer

Writing in an op-ed for The Hill, PPI Founder and President Will Marshall highlights the problems with President Trump’s use of tariffs to attempt a restructuring of the world’s economy.

The president can sign all the executive orders he pleases, but he can’t throw history into reverse or repeal basic economics.

Marshall points out that Americans “aren’t buying MAGAnomics.”

Consumer confidence has plummeted to a 12-year low, with families cutting back on spending in anticipation of a return to high living costs.

Investors are rattled too. By mid-March, the stock market had lost more than $3 trillion since Trump took office — the equivalent of 10 percent of America’s $30 trillion GDP.

In a recent YouGov poll, 61 percent of voters said tariffs hurt average working people, while just 14 percent said they would help.

And takes on Trump’s attempt to return manufacturing jobs to America.

The president apparently sees tariffs as a form of reparations for working Americans. But the culprit isn’t trade or globalization or “neoliberalism.” It’s the emergence of a post-industrial economy shaped mainly by technological change, rising education levels and growing demand for services.

Factory employment has declined in all advanced countries, even manufacturing powerhouses like Germany and Japan. But thanks to tech-driven productivity gains, U.S. manufacturing output has increased by more than 60 percent since 1999, even as our factory workforce has contracted by about 25 percent.

The U.S., like most other high-income countries, has evolved into a predominantly service-based economy. Services account for 80 percent of non-farm jobs. Even if more factories sprout up here, job gains are likely to be modest due to automation.

In fact, since Trump’s first set of tariffs, manufacturing employment has stagnated, up by only 30,000 since 2018, compared to 400,000 in the second Obama term.

And with over half a million manufacturing jobs open over the last five years, blue-collar workers themselves appear ambivalent about factory careers.

A 2023 YouGov poll commissioned by the Progressive Policy Institute asked non-college workers where they think their children will find the best jobs and careers. Most (44 percent) choose the communications and digital economy, while just 13 percent picked manufacturing.

PPI’s First Trade Fact of 2024 Illustrates Positives of Supply Chain Efficiency on Consumer Pricing

Ed Gresser, PPI’s Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, began 2024 looking at the intersection of the upcoming Presidential election and trade in PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: The price of a 40-inch TV set has fallen by 99% in 25 years.

One of the policy proposals of the 2024 Presidential Campaign is former President Trump’s proposal to enact an additional 10% annual tariff on imports. Former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer defended this proposal to the New York Times, saying:

“If all you chase is efficiency — if you think the person is better off on the unemployment line with a third 40-inch television than he is working with only two — then you’re not going to agree with me,” Mr. Lighthizer said. “There’s a group of people who think that consumption is the end. And my view is production is the end, and safe and happy communities are the end. You should be willing to pay a price for that.”

Gresser deftly takes apart this argument by looking at the history of the 40-inch plasma TV. He points out that efficiency in the supply chain has cut the cost of a 40-inch plasma TV from $22,900 in 1970 to less than $400 a few decades later. A 10% tariff on that TV would “set [consumers] back about $20 (or $60 if they wanted to buy three). Over the entire TV-making and -selling world, this would likely put some retail clerks out of their jobs, but likewise wouldn’t affect production.”

Gresser also looks at how President Trump would have the authority to impose new tariff system.

“Constitutionally, only Congress has the right to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Asked by the Times’ political team about how a President could create an entirely new tariff system by himself, the Ambassador cites some existing trade laws that might enable a President to declare a “national emergency” and impose it by decree.”

Rand Research Releases Report on Forced Labor Enforcement

Earlier this month, Rand released the Forced Labor in Global Supply Chains: Trade Enforcement Impacts and Opportunities report. The research was led by the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, which operates the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC). The project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security and was “designed to assist DHS in developing analytical capabilities for assessing the impact of its efforts to combat forced labor through trade enforcement and evaluating that impact. The report discusses the methods that we used to evaluate DHS’s impact and presents the result of the analyses, including findings on trade enforcement and recommendations for strengthening enforcement.”

Rand finds that the trade enforcement is making measurable progress, but “stakeholders are encountering impediments that DHS cannot address entirely on its own.” They also say that trade enforcement “cannot change China’s policy on forced labor in the XUAR” alone. Rand offers six recommendations to strengthen trade enforcement:

Look for opportunities to encourage robust stakeholder participation by improving the flow and quality of information through greater transparency and improvements in tools, technology, and methods of data analysis.
Consider a more comprehensive approach to combating forced labor in global supply chains by working with other U.S. agencies and other countries to better leverage potential complementarities of economic sanctions and other types of measures.
Consider options for mitigating unintended consequences in concert with other U.S. agencies and with input from nongovernmental stakeholders, either by reducing them or responding to them, depending on their severity and likely prevalence.
Work with other U.S. agencies to monitor indicators of progress and unintended consequences over time to better understand how conditions are evolving.
Develop evidence with stakeholders to inform public debates on trade enforcement, including those on concerns about de minimis entries and environmental initiatives.
Continue to make the case for funding and staffing, which are critical resources for trade enforcement and are likely to need to increase.

Semafor: Trump administration weighs adding Shein, Temu to forced labor list

Semafor is reporting that the Trump administration is thinking about adding Shein and Temu to the UFLPA Entity List. An investigation by the House China Select Committee in 2023 concluded that Shein and Temu exploit the de minimis exemption to “evade customs enforcement” and that Temu has “no system to ensure compliance with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA)” and that Temu admitted it “does not expressly prohibit third-party sellers from selling products based on their origin in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.”

“It would be a pretty bold move,” to add the fast-fashion companies to the list, said Greta Peisch, a former general counsel for the US trade representative under the Biden administration. She added that, alongside the ending of the shipping exemption, it would show the Trump administration is “really targeting consumer goods.”

Sourcing Journal: Apparel Import Bookings Down Nearly 60% Ahead of ‘Reciprocal’ Tariffs

Sourcing Journal is reporting analysis from Vizion that apparel sellers are drastically pulling back imports to the U.S. in response to the Trump tariffs.

According to [Kyle Henderson, CEO and co-founder of Vizion], as of Friday, many of his brand customers have still been advised to take a wait-and-see approach, instead of booking. However, he has seen some businesses take the risk if they believe they can handle the worst-case financial scenario.

“If there are meaningful shipments where you determined you could bear the financial burden if need be, then there will be some decisions to ship some of that volume,” “Typically the transit time from these most-tariffed origin countries is between three-to-eight weeks. You could get some shipments done in 90 days if you had to. The question though is, is [the tariff delay] really going to be 90 days?

Vizion 4.16.25

Supply Chains and Due Diligence: Insights from the OECD Forum on Due Diligence in the Garment and Footwear Sector

Last week, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) hosted the 2025 Forum on Due Diligence in the Garment and Footwear Sector. In case you were not in Paris, here are some of the highlights. During the Forum, the OECD released two papers and also held a series of side sessions for the public. In this FIA, we share analysis of the papers and a link to one of the side sessions that discusses engagement with Gen Z.

The OECD released a Business and Finance policy paper, The role of sustainability certifications in due diligence in the garment and footwear sector. The OECD examines the rise in sustainability certifications in the garment and footwear sector from 2018 to 2023 and also provides detailed information about the types of certifications. According to the OECD, the number of facilities certified under the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) increased by 154% and the number of facilities certified under the Oeko-Tex Sustainable Textile and Leather Production (SteP) increased by 242%. While the proportion of certified fibers and materials make up a small percentage of the materials currently available in the market, the OECD company survey finds that 81% of brands and retailers now require sustainability certifications from their suppliers.

OECD1 2.20.25

The policy paper places these sustainability certifications into three main categories, examines how they are currently being used by brands and retailers, and includes considerations for both companies and policymakers.

OECD2 2.20.25

Especially interesting is the table that reviews the types of sustainability certifications, the purpose of the certification, and what organizations offer each certification.

OECD3 2.20.25

The OECD also released a new report Measuring the uptake and impact of due diligence for responsible supply chains. The technical report explains how the OECD’s new monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework can help researchers and businesses show the positive results of adopting the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector. The framework is intended to help businesses “better understand the effectiveness of their due diligence” by suggesting the types of information that could be of interest and the possible research designs that businesses could use to leverage their data. Be sure to take a look at Table 2, which provides examples of sources to measure due diligence.

One of the key side sessions was organized and moderated by Dr. Sheng Lu, Professor in the University of Delaware’s Department of Fashion and Apparel Studies. Due Diligence Education for Gen Z: Preparing Future Fashion Leaders for Sustainable and Socially Responsible Apparel Sourcing features key industry leaders: Laurie Rando, Senior Director of Sustainable Product and Human Rights, Macy’s; Megan Dawson-Elli, Manager of Product Sustainability, Tapestry; Matthias Knappe, Head of Fibres, Textiles and Clothing Unit, International Trade Centre; Emilie Delaye, Master’s Student, Fashion and Apparel Studies, University of Delaware; and USFIA President Julia Hughes.

The goal for this discussion is to highlight the role that Gen Z plays today as consumers and will play as future industry leaders. We talk about how college and university programs can equip Gen Z with the information about due diligence, sustainable sourcing, and supply chain transparency that will help shape the future of responsible apparel sourcing. And there is an inspiring discussion about the importance of industry-academic partnerships.

Tariffs: Bark Worse Than Bite?

We share with members an analysis by Charles Schwab that looks at the four potential reasons why the market is dismissing the threat of tariffs and reasons for caution, despite the market responding positively to Trump’s first week in office.

No Day One tariffs enacted as had been pledged.

Despite the fact that President Trump told reporters he was planning to enact the 25% tariffs against Canada and Mexico on February 1, there was no immediate action on tariffs and they were not mentioned in Trump’s inaugural address.

But there are still risks the market may be ignoring. Notably, President Trump's comments and the presidential memorandum on trade policy note that several federal agencies were instructed to review a broad range of trade issues and to report back with recommendations by April 1.

U.S. energy exports offered as a way for Europe and China to avoid tariffs.

President Trump and Scott Bessent, his nominee for Treasury Secretary, have suggested that Europe and China could avoid import tariffs if they buy more U.S. energy.

Producing enough energy to narrow the trade gaps may take substantial energy price inflation in the U.S., something the administration may be wary of facilitating.

The new political leadership in Europe and Canada are more like Trump, easing the path to cutting a deal.

Markets may be taking comfort in the rising potential for warmer cross-border relationships. Accommodative personalities may make trade talks go more smoothly but doesn't guarantee resolution to the focus around Trump's trade policies—the massive U.S. trade gap.

Global trade survived Trump 1.0.

If history is any indication, the current tariff proposals may simply be negotiation tools leading toward agreements with China and other countries, and potentially much less disruptive to economic growth, inflation, sales, and operations of multi-national corporations. The market seems to believe that Trump will continue to use dramatic tariff announcements as a tool of statecraft to extract actions or concessions, rather than tools of economic policy. The risk? Trump 2.0 may differ significantly from Trump 1.0.

The State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment, and Trade

Dr. Sheng Lu, Professor in the University of Delaware’s Department of Fashion and Apparel Studies, recently published a look at the state of textile and apparel manufacturing, employment, and trade as of April 2025.

One goal for the Trump Admin is to bring manufacturing back to the U.S. It has been a long time since a substantial amount of US apparel has been made here, but it's important to review the options.

One of the important findings in this analysis -- which we reprint in full below -- is the structure of the domestic apparel industry today. The analysis highlights that U.S. apparel manufacturers today are primarily micro-factories, and they are not in a position to replace imports. As of 2021 (the latest data available), over 76% of U.S.-based apparel mills (NAICS 315) had fewer than 10 employees, while only 0.7% had more than 500 employees. … In other words, replacing global sourcing with domestic production is not a realistic option for U.S. fashion brands and retailers in the 21st-century global economy.

The State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment, and Trade

Textile and apparel manufacturing in the U.S. has significantly decreased over the past decades due to factors such as automation, import competition, and the changing U.S. comparative advantages for related products. However, thanks to companies’ ongoing restructuring strategies and their strategic use of globalization, the U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing sector has stayed relatively stable in recent years. For example, the value of U.S. yarns and fabrics manufacturing (NAICS 313) totaled $24 billion in 2023 (the latest data available), up from $23.3 billion in 2018 (or up 2.8%). Over the same period, U.S. made-up textiles (NAICS 314) and apparel production (NAICS 315) moderately declined by only 1.8% and 1.6%.

More importantly, the U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing sector is evolving. Several important trends are worth watching:

First, “Made in the USA” increasingly focuses on textile products, particularly high-tech industrial textiles that are not intended for apparel manufacturing purposes. Specifically, textile products (NAICS 313+314) accounted for over 83% of the total output of the U.S. textile and apparel industry as of 2023, much higher than only 56% in 1998 (U.S. Census, 2025). Textiles and apparel “Made in the USA” are growing particularly fast in some product categories that are high-tech driven, such as medical textiles, protective clothing, specialty and industrial fabrics, and non-woven. These products are also becoming the new growth engine of U.S. textile exports. Notably, between 2019 and 2022, the value of U.S. “nonwoven fabric” (NAICS 31323) production increased by 12.32%, much higher than the 1.15% average growth of the textile industry (NAICS 313). Similarly, while U.S. textile exports decreased by 13.75% between 2019 and 2024, “nonwoven fabric” exports surged by 10.48%--including nearly 40% that went to market outside the Western Hemisphere (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2025).

Second, U.S. apparel manufacturers today are primarily micro-factories, and they supplement but are not in a position to replace imports. As of 2021 (the latest data available), over 76% of U.S.-based apparel mills (NAICS 315) had fewer than 10 employees, while only 0.7% had more than 500 employees. In comparison, contracted garment factories of U.S. fashion companies in Asia, particularly in developing countries like Bangladesh, typically employ over 1,000 or even 5,000 workers.

Instead of making garments in large volumes, most U.S.-based apparel factories are used to produce samples or prototypes for brands and retailers. In other words, replacing global sourcing with domestic production is not a realistic option for U.S. fashion brands and retailers in the 21st-century global economy. Nor are U.S. fashion companies showing interest in shifting their business strategies from focusing on “designing + managing supply chain+ marketing” back to manufacturing.

Meanwhile, due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and to leverage economies of scale, approximately 5% of U.S. textile mills (NAICS313) had more than 500 employees as of 2021--this is a significant number, considering that textile manufacturing is a highly capital-intensive process.

Third, employment in the U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing sector continued to decline, with improved productivity and technology being critical drivers. As of 2024, employment in the U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing sector (NAICS 313, 314, and 315) totaled 270,700, a decrease of 18.4% from 33,190 in 2019. Notably, U.S. textile and apparel workers had become more productive overall—the labor productivity index of U.S. textile mills (NAICS 313) increased from 89.7 in 2019 to 94.4 in 2023, and the index of U.S. apparel mills (NAICS 315) increased from 105.8 to 110.78 over the same period.

On the other hand, clothing retailers (NAICS 4481) accounted for over 75.7% of employment in the U.S. textile and apparel sector in 2024.

Fourth, international trade, BOTH import and export, supports textiles and apparel “Made in the USA.” On the one hand, U.S. textile and apparel exports exceeded $12.5 billion in 2024, accounting for more than 30% of domestic production as of 2023 (NAICS 313, 314 and 315). Thanks to regional free trade agreements, particularly the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the Western Hemisphere stably accounted for over 70% of U.S. textile and apparel exports over the past decades. However, for specific products such as industrial textiles, markets in the rest of the world, especially Asia and Europe, also become increasingly important. Thus, lowering trade barriers for U.S. products in strategically significant export markets serves the interest of the U.S. textile and apparel industry.

On the other hand, imports support textiles and apparel “Made in the USA” as well. A 2023 study found that among the manufacturers in the “Made in the USA” database managed by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Textile and Apparel, nearly 20% of apparel and fabric mills explicitly say they utilized imported components. Partially, smaller U.S. textile and apparel manufacturers appear to be more likely to use imported components--whereas 20% of manufacturers with less than 50 employees used imported input, only 10.2% of those with 50-499 employees and 7.7% with 500 or more employees did so. The results indicate the necessity of supporting small and medium-sized (SME) U.S. textile and apparel manufacturers to more easily access their needed textile materials by lowering trade barriers like tariffs.

Trade Fact of the Week: Sometimes countries make big and fateful choices…and sometimes their big and fateful choices go badly wrong

Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at the Progressive Policy Institute, put out his trade fact of the week, elaborating on PPI’s newest report Trump’s Folly, Harris’ Opportunity: Trade and the Blue-Collar Worker. The report “assesses the limitations of “Bidenomics”' honorable-but-not-quite-successful effort to create a “worker-centred” trade policy, and then suggests ways to connect trade policy to blue-collar aspirations and concerns, organized around a “guidepost” and four policy themes.” Two of those policy themes are purging junk tariffs and creating more export opportunities, as opposed to a national sales tax.

Theme 1: Bring home goods prices down by purging junk tariffs. Reduce the cost of living by purging the 11,414-line tariff system of lines — for groceries, for clothes and shoes, for small appliances, and table silverware – which raise prices, discriminate against women and lower-income families, and don’t protect any jobs. The launch for this is the Fletcher/Pettersen Pink Tariffs Study Act introduced by Reps. Lizzie Fletcher and Brittany Pettersen this spring.

Theme 2: Help workers find better jobs by creating more export opportunities. Data from the Census and BEA illustrate the high quality of jobs in exporting firms. As just one example, African American-owned exporting firms average 10 more employees and $10,000 more in payroll per worker than the U.S. business community generally. Here the next president can build on some creative Biden team policy launches — see Secretary Raimondo’s launch of the Global Diversity Exporter Initiative — and combine this with revived Obama-era themes of opening markets, pooling strengths, and building relationships with friends and allies.

Trade Fact of the Week: The Trump Campaign is Proposing a Higher Tea Tax than George III

Last week, PPI’s Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets, put out a trade fact of the week tying together the history of July 4th and Trump’s proposed tariff plan. As you can see in the graphic below, Trump’s campaign proposal would raise taxes on Chinese tea 2% higher than what triggered the Boston Tea Party.

PPITea7.9.24

Transparentem Report Finds Child Labor, Pesticides on Indian Organic Cotton Farms

Transparentem recently released From Field to Fabric: Enhancing Due Diligence in Cotton Supply Chains, summarizing the findings of an investigation between June 2022 and March 2023 on cotton farms in the Khargone and Barwani districts of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The investigation found evidence of child labor and illegal adolescent labor, debt bondage, withholding of wages, other wage violations and poverty-level wages, abusive working conditions, and abuse of vulnerability on farms connected to the Pratibha Syntex, Maral Overseas, and Remei India/Remei AG supply chains. Transparentem also found evidence that the organic cotton farms connected to the Pratibha Syntex supply chain may be tainted by pesticides.

Transparentem recommends brands and retailers to get involved in remediation efforts and programs to improve working conditions, such as the Fair Labor Association’s Harvesting the Future – Cotton in India. The report includes detailed information about supplier engagement by Indian companies, as well as corporate responses and engagement with Transparentem. There is a useful table that lists Cotton sourcing initiatives, certifications, and business associations, including YESS.

While there are inherent challenges in addressing complex and systemic issues, Transparentem continues to urge the suppliers and buyers to move with urgency toward implementing remediation plans to prevent and respond to all identified risks so that children and workers do not continue to suffer.

cotton sourcing initiatives 1.8.25

UNCTAD Global Trade Update: The Impact of Escalating Global Tariffs on Small and Vulnerable Economies

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development published an April 2025 Global Trade Update, looking at the impact of “reciprocal tariffs” on small and vulnerable economies. The report finds that small and least developed countries represent a marginal share of the U.S. trade deficit – less than 0.1% each – but their export abilities will be disproportionately affected by the “reciprocal tariffs.”

The new tariffs would generate minimal additional revenue, even if import volumes remained unchanged. Thirty-six of our trading partners would generate less than 1% of current U.S. tariff revenues. We share the graphic below but note that it is a searchable table in the Global Trade Update.

Their conclusion?

This is a critical moment to consider exempting them from tariffs that offer little to no advantage for US trade policy while potentially causing serious economic harm abroad.

The report also includes a timeline of U.S. trade policy decisions.

most trading partners facing reciprocal tariffs would generate minimal additional revenue for the us

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Reports&Analysis

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: In a hypothetical Trump/Vance economy, a toaster would cost about $300

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Polling: U.S. public is against Trump tariffs by about 60%-36%

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Tariffs are a poor form of taxation

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: The 1890s were not America’s “wealthiest” age

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: Trump tariffs more likely to shrink than enlarge U.S. manufacturing industry

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. clothing tariffs are unfair to women

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

PPI Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. tariffs are taxes paid by Americans

PPI: Brace yourself: Trump’s trade war is about to make Americans poorer

PPI’s First Trade Fact of 2024 Illustrates Positives of Supply Chain Efficiency on Consumer Pricing

Rand Research Releases Report on Forced Labor Enforcement

Semafor: Trump administration weighs adding Shein, Temu to forced labor list

Sourcing Journal: Apparel Import Bookings Down Nearly 60% Ahead of ‘Reciprocal’ Tariffs

Supply Chains and Due Diligence: Insights from the OECD Forum on Due Diligence in the Garment and Footwear Sector

Tariffs: Bark Worse Than Bite?

The State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment, and Trade

Trade Fact of the Week: Sometimes countries make big and fateful choices…and sometimes their big and fateful choices go badly wrong

Trade Fact of the Week: The Trump Campaign is Proposing a Higher Tea Tax than George III

Transparentem Report Finds Child Labor, Pesticides on Indian Organic Cotton Farms

UNCTAD Global Trade Update: The Impact of Escalating Global Tariffs on Small and Vulnerable Economies

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News

Tariff Coalition Releases Report Showing $27B in Extra Tariffs

White House Highlights Reduced Trade Deficit

Ways & Means Committee Advances Haiti & AGOA Legislation

Senators Introduce Bipartisan Digital Trade Promotion Act

USTR Announces Section 301 Tariffs on Nicaragua

TRACKING TRUMP'S TARIFFS

Events

Reports

2025 Sourcing Trends Mid-Year Update

2025 Mid-Year Sourcing Report: WTO's top Apparel Exporters in 2024

2025 USFIA Fashion Industry Benchmarking Study

Higher tariffs have triggered ripple effects across supply chains.

U.S. fashion companies are actively exploring new sourcing opportunities, with a particular focus on emerging suppliers in Asia

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